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State intervention in India has persisted but has proved far from immune to 
critiques of traditional dirigisme. An examination of the power sector shows that 
waves of reforms since 1991 have together created a hybrid and regionally 
differentiated state-market system. Blurring the public-private boundary, this 
reinvented “state capitalism 2.0” displays both refurbished modes of intervention 
and new governance arrangements with private players. Nonetheless, as the 
power sector’s continually dismal condition suggests, this state-capitalist hybrid 
has not (yet) provided a coherent alternative to older dirigisme or the Anglo-
American mode of “deregulatory” liberalization. Instead, between 1991 and 2014 
its ad hoc, layered emergence generated distinctive forms of dysfunction. 
Coupled with competitive politics, its ever-increasing institutional complexity 
rendered it internally incoherent and vulnerable to rent seeking on multiple fronts. 
Power sector evidence suggests that state intervention in India has remained 
simultaneously indispensable and dogged by persistent administrative and 
financial difficulties. Examining its internal institutional transformations helps to 
explain the apparently contradictory nature of the contemporary Indian state: at 
once business-friendly, populist, and often underperforming.  
 
 
1  Reinventing state intervention 
In recent years state intervention has enjoyed a renewal of academic interest. Scholars wrote 
of the “flexible” or “hidden” developmental states of pre-recession Ireland and the United 
States (Ó Riain 2000; Block 2008), the rise of a more “regulatory” form of state activism in 
China (Yang 2004; Hsueh 2011), and the “new”, “liberal”, or “renewed” developmentalism 
of Brazil, then still growing strongly (Ban 2013; Trubek 2013; Hochstetler and Montero 
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2013). This nascent literature suggested that the state activism of the twenty-first century was 
far from a return to the old centrally planned dirigisme of the twentieth: the state’s forms and 
activities had been transformed in the face of changing economic and political contexts.  
According to this interpretation, the second generation of state intervention has two 
interrelated “vocations” (Levy 2006: 368). It is corrective, seeking to repair ineffectual 
elements in older national models—often in line with Washington Consensus-style critiques. 
But it is also constructive, oriented towards creating, supporting, and adjusting rather than 
dominating markets. As such it is characterized by new forms of public-private governance 
arrangements and the increasing exposure of state agencies to the discipline of market 
competition, however asymmetric in practice (Trubek 2013; Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014). 
This fusion of dirigisme and liberalization has many labels, but perhaps the most catchy and 
evocative is “state capitalism 2.0”.1 
For a brief moment in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, state 
capitalism 2.0 captured attention as a possible alternative to the Anglo-American 
deregulatory model. India often featured as a marginal example in these discussions; and 
perhaps the most influential strand of recent political-economy research on the subcontinent 
has corroborated the notion of a revised and increasingly private-sector-oriented state 
interventionism.2 How, then, does India’s variant of state capitalism 2.0—the combination of 
state activism and elements of the Washington Consensus—actually work? Does it really 
amount to anything like a coherent alternative to outright liberalization?  
The present chapter explores these questions using a case study of a crucial sector, the 
electricity supply industry, from 1991 to 2014. Electricity lies at the heart of India’s 
distributive politics and the drive for economic growth. Existing examinations of the Indian 
state have often focused on capital, land, and labour, but energy—and especially electricity—
is the other key input for contemporary capital accumulation. As such, it deserves a central 
role in accounts of state transformation. The power sector is also a bellwether of institutional 
change. While the international postwar consensus saw electricity as a natural monopoly best 
                                                   
1 The term “state capitalism 2.0” owes its inspiration to the work of Aldo Musacchio in particular, especially in 
his interventions in the business press. See also Nölke (2014), who prefers “state capitalism 3.0” for this same 
phenomenon. While a plethora of terms have attached themselves to the phenomenon, “state capitalism” neatly 
emphasizes continuities in state involvement and the close links between state and capital.  
2 Atul Kohli has argued that “[w]hile some liberalization is real, Indian state remains activist” but increasingly 
“pro-business” (2007: 108). This “pro-business interpretation” has been widely endorsed by Indian political-
economy scholars (if not their neoclassical counterparts): a 2013 workshop—including Pranab Bardhan, Vijay 
Joshi, Mushtaq Khan, James Manor, R. Nagaraj, Pallavi Roy, Kunal Sen, Alpa Shah, Aseema Sinha, Louise 
Tillin, and Michael Walton—upheld Kohli’s core distinction between the “pro-market” (open competitive) 
policies characteristic of textbook liberalization and the “pro-business” (activist pro-incumbent) policies 
associated with India’s “pro-business tilt” since the 1980s (Tillin 2013: 21).  
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left to the public sector, power generation was the first sector in India opened to private 
investors in 1991. This began a quarter-century of reform and re-regulation, significantly 
inflected by regional variations as the crucial distribution segment remained in the hands of 
subnational (state) governments. The power sector is therefore an important—and often 
overlooked—case through which to study the distinctive trajectory of institutional change 
that India’s haphazard and partial liberalization has brought.  
At the same time, the sector’s fate provides salutary lessons about the contradictions 
and dysfunction that plague India’s reinvented interventionist state. In many states tariffs for 
industrial and commercial consumers are extremely high and supply remains inadequate, 
characterized by power cuts and voltage fluctuations. In contrast, populist subsidies persist: 
huge proportions of electricity generated is systematically stolen or given cheaply to farmers 
and residential consumers, although these groups also suffer from the poor quality of 
supply—a “low-level equilibrium” trap (Dubash 2007). Around 300 million Indians remain 
without access to electricity altogether. This crucial sector thus demonstrates the same 
contradictions noted more widely in India: between pro-business and populist politics, rapid 
economic growth and policy incoherence.  
This chapter examines the power sector since 1991 in order to shed light on state 
capacity in India during the economic reform era. It first outlines the key changes to the 
state’s form and functions in the sector between 1991 and 2014, during which time the state 
continued to play myriad roles, new and old (Section 2). Dirigisme and liberalization are not 
neatly “fused” to create state capitalism 2.0. Instead, reinventing state intervention through 
the incorporation of liberalized elements is a haphazard process that differently inflects 
various institutions. Constrained by political interests, power reforms proceeded not through 
displacement of older statist organizations but through a process of ad hoc institutional 
layering, or organizational creation without much destruction. Rather than supplanting the 
older system, liberalized and unreformed segments continued to exist in parallel, even 
intertwined. The result is a public-private system in which different groups can exercise 
influence via different state agencies and tiers. This state-market hybrid has exacerbated the 
sector’s existing predicament, and even generated new sources of financial and administrative 
dysfunction (Sections 3 and 4). Contributing to the nascent body of research on liberalized 
“new developmental states”, this paper therefore suggests that, at least until 2014 and in the 
power sector, state intervention in India remained simultaneously indispensable and dogged 
by persistent policy failings. India’s is a “weak-strong state”, remaining both more 
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interventionist than is often acknowledged and yet also less coherent.3 Understanding its 
apparently paradoxical dynamics—going beyond the unhelpful truism that it is “Janus-
faced”—requires unpacking the state’s institutional structures themselves.  
 
2 The state’s changing form and function: liberalization as layering  
In the first decade after India’s independence the state secured control over the power sector.4 
Responsibility was constitutionally shared between the centre and provincial states: while the 
centre provides broad policy direction, it is the states that control the crucial “last mile” of 
distribution. Throughout the 1950s the states tightened their grip. The key institutions were 
the state electricity boards (SEBs), vertically integrated monopolies under the politicized 
control of state governments, which controlled almost three-quarters of generation and 
virtually all distribution by 1991.  
The most important outcome of this institutional settlement was the emergence at the 
subnational level of an incoherent and financially ruinous politics of populist electricity 
subsidies and widespread power theft. While in the early years after independence tariff 
structures were generally established to favour industrialists, gradually this balance altered to 
favour wealthier agriculturalists. This shift was especially pronounced in states with powerful 
agricultural lobbies—Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, and Maharashtra, for 
example—which were in turn reinforced by the subsidies, rendering these regional political 
economies of power path-dependent (Kale 2014a). Cost recovery was only around 79 per 
cent by 1991 and power subsidies were some states’ largest budgetary burden, creating a 
vicious circle of underpayment, underinvestment, and deteriorating performance.  
 
Grafting on private participation  
By the 1980s, it was widely agreed that the sector required overhauling. Outright dismantling 
of the flawed statist system was both ideologically and politically difficult to imagine, 
however. While a surprising number of politicians agreed that some degree of private 
participation was desirable, if not inevitable, none were inclined to moot full-scale 
                                                   
3 Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) originally used the paradoxical idea of a “weak-strong state” to capture the 
robustness of India’s public institutions on one hand, and the state’s failure to penetrate society, especially in 
rural areas, on the other. The present chapter is somewhat less sanguine about the country’s institutional capacity 
at the centre, but similarly contends that the crucial role of the state in India’s political economy has continued 
into the twenty-first century. 
4 While the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution reserved generation and distribution for the public sector, the 
small number of existing private units (primarily in cities) continued to be tolerated.  
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privatization.5 More importantly, powerful interest groups—such as farmer lobbies and the 
politicians who courted them with power subsidies—had become more entrenched over time 
within the existing system. Even when chief ministers became convinced of the case for 
power reform as the 1990s progressed, sustained implementation would prove slow and 
painful, as shown by the faltering of reform in early movers such as Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, 
and Andhra Pradesh.  
These constraints helped to shape a distinctive trajectory of reform. The power sector 
has not simply witnessed an undifferentiated process of “liberalization”, but a more complex 
process of institutional layering. Layering refers to a dynamic of gradual institutional change 
whereby new or renegotiated organizational elements do not supplant or eliminate preexisting 
structures, but are superimposed or grafted onto them (van der Heijden 2011). It is the 
product of political strategy as well as inertia: because “[e]stablished institutions create 
constituencies for their preservation”, it is “typically easier to add new institutions than to 
dismantle preexisting ones” (Schickler 2001: 252).  
The results of liberalization-as-layering are also distinctive. Rather than a steady 
process of deregulation toward an ideal-typical liberal-market economy, it produces a form of 
improvised “patchwork”. Old, new, and reinvented organizations come to coexist, although 
cumulative change may be substantial. Of course, no process of reform ever completely 
erases older structures.6 Rather than this very generic consequence, I suggest, the distinctive 
institutional product of layering is a messy system of segmentation, in which a liberalized 
zone emerges in parallel (or rather entangled) with existing statist organs.7  
With radical institutional dismantling politically unfeasible, reform in the power 
sector accordingly took the form of the ad hoc accretion of new agencies. The entry of the 
private sector into the state-dominated power system proceeded through a series of 
incremental policy changes which began to create a dual system, incorporating private 
participation in parallel with the pre-existing public system rather than displacing it. First 
came the opening of a “back door” to private participation through loosened regulations on 
captive generation for large consumers, creating a readymade constituency for greater private 
                                                   
5 The opinions of many senior politicians, from a range of states and political parties, can be found in 
Department of Power (1989). 
6 The classic example is Pierson (1994) on the limits of welfare state retrenchment even under Reagan and 
Thatcher.  
7 This has some similarities with the concept of “dualization”, most often applied to labour markets, in which a 
core of favoured insiders coexists with an increasingly large set of informal workers. In the case of the power 




1991 brought more explicit reform: as in much of Asia, independent power producers 
(IPPs) were invited to establish projects, encouraged with a variety of generous incentives 
and central guarantees—as Enron’s Dabhol project in Maharashtra would make notorious. 
With the amendment of the 1948 Electricity (Supply) Act, the IPP policy focused narrowly 
on increasing generation capacity and mobilizing scarce capital, thereby “promising to 
support rather than dismantle the existing [political-economic] matrix” (Kale 2014a: 99). The 
emphasis was not on privatization, but the introduction of new greenfield projects in parallel 
with the public system. This logic would continue through the mooted mega projects of the 
later 1990s and accelerated with the ultra mega power projects of the twenty-first century, 
partnerships which combined private participation with renewed state activism.  
As has often been pointed out, the early focus on generation left the system’s major 
problems—primarily the politicization of the distribution segment—virtually untouched. The 
second phase of reform saw subnational experiments with distribution reforms. The third 
phase, the comprehensive legislation passed as the Electricity Act of 2003, attempted to 
mandate competition in the segment, by enabling large consumers to purchase power directly 
from the market (“open access”) instead of relying on local power utilities. On paper, it 
marked a striking attempt to displace existing institutions with an alternative operating logic, 
an ambitious attempt to go beyond patchwork solutions.  
Yet even after distribution was recognized as a gaping hole in the reform process, 
politicians and technocrats have struggled to reform the segment. Of all the states, only 
Odisha and Delhi have privatized distribution, the former with major financial difficulties—
by 2015 all its distribution utilities had returned to government control—and the latter 
prompting a major populist backlash in the form of the Aam Admi Party. In practice, many 
states remained reluctant to cede control over their most lucrative customers, resorting to 
high charges to discourage exit and thereby stymying open access from above. Private 
investors, too, have generally been wary of becoming enmeshed in this most politicized and 
financially troubled of segments. As this suggests, there have so far been striking limits to 
outright liberalization in the sector. 
 
The resilience of state intervention 
Throughout this process, the state has continued to play a crucial role, both through inertia 
                                                   
8 Similarly, in 1994 the government permitted firms invested in power generation, cement, and steel projects to 
establish “captive” coal mines, laying the groundwork for the later “Coalgate” scandal (Jenkins 1999: 190). 
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and necessity. The notion that reform could mean reconfigured rather than reduced state 
intervention both predated and survived 1991. The centre in particular repeatedly attempted 
to bolster its hand against the states through direct intervention in the sector.  
While distribution remained the purview of intransigent state governments, 
generation, transmission, and infrastructure financing have consistently provided greater 
opportunities for the centre to exert leverage. Central public sector enterprises (CPSEs) in 
thermal and hydroelectric power generation were accordingly established in the mid-1970s, 
followed by the central transmission utility Powergrid in 1989. Explicitly introduced to 
provide an exemplar of public sector best practice, the National Thermal Power Corporation 
(NTPC) remains one of Asia’s largest power generation companies. These CPSEs continue to 
be used (with modest success) to strong-arm state utilities into more responsible fiscal 
behaviour; NTPC even took over Odisha’s Talcher plant in 1997 for nonpayment. At the 
same time these are not the same CPSEs as those of the 1970s: they have subsequently been 
corporatized and granted varying degrees of autonomy, as part of a parallel (if unarticulated) 
drive for institutional reform (Chatterjee 2017b). 
The centre also created major financial corporations, most notably the Rural 
Electrification Corporation (in 1969) and the Power Finance Corporation (1986), to guide 
policy development along its favoured lines through loan conditionalities; this approach 
continued into the era of centrally sponsored schemes and new, state-backed infrastructure 
investment funds in the 2000s. Both of these trends were bolstered by the desire to encourage 
further resource exploration, including overseas, and the development of renewable energy 
investments. By adding another layer of agencies under the line ministries, though, the 
central apex would inadvertently increase the sector’s institutional complexity, exacerbate 
interministerial conflicts, and reinforce its own infrastructure agencies’ abilities to act in their 
interests rather than those of a single coherent policy, as we shall see.  
This project of state reinvention was reinforced from another direction. The perceived 
excesses of the sector’s ad hoc opening and the courtship of private capital provoked an 
awkward oscillation between deregulation and reregulation, testifying to the tensions 
between state and market inherent in India’s evolving form of state capitalism. In view of the 
egregious corruption that became attached to the IPP policy in the 1990s, for example, the 
centre moved to develop model concession agreements, and to emphasize competitive 
auctions over discretionary selections. Electricity regulatory commissions were also 
introduced at both the state and central levels, and made mandatory in 1998. A alternative 
history could be written of electricity reregulation coterminous with deregulation: as in the 
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global North, policymakers are beginning to recognize that market regulation, environmental 
concerns, and “turning and keeping the lights on” may all require “more (and improved), not 
less, state capacity” (Dubash 2011: 71).  
Yet this regulatory transformation of the state ought not be overstated; changes in 
form sometimes ran ahead of function. India’s power reforms did not occur in a vacuum, but 
at least in the first decade after 1998 echoed an international template then endorsed by the 
World Bank. The result was something of an “add-and-stir” approach to regulators, which 
were imported at the state level with little domestic discussion; Navroz Dubash reports that 
the unlikely pioneer, Odisha, included them as “a somewhat formulaic appendage to a larger 
sector-reform process” in order to appease private investors and international donors (2013: 
102). In several states they have been integrated only half-heartedly, and instead appear as a 
supplemental layer of institutions with an ambivalent relationship to the state governments, 
state utilities, private investors, and consumers. The Electricity Act, passed in 2003, 
continued in this mode, assuming that “an apolitical regulatory sphere” could be successfully 
sutured onto the politicized power system “simply by legislating one” (Dubash 2013: 103). 
India’s reinvented state capitalism may now demonstrate some of the morphological features 
of the European-style “regulatory state”, but it has certainly not been entirely colonized by 
technocrats (see also Dubash and Morgan 2013).  
 
The segmented public-private system 
As Dubash has argued, “it would be more accurate to describe the market as grafted on to 
rather than replacing the state sector, and with decidedly mixed results” (2011: 69). The result 
of these piecemeal, layered reforms—private collaboration on one hand, and resilient or 
reconfigured modes of state intervention on the other—was not the fully liberalized market 
system in line with the so-called World Bank template for power reforms. Instead, it 
produced a “dual” or “hybrid” structure which “combin[ed] attributes of the state- and 
market-based systems” (Victor and Heller 2007: 30).  
This hybridity proved highly uneven across the segments of the electricity supply 
industry. The last decade saw a very rapid expansion of private generation, so that in late 
2014 private producers outweighed state-level producers for the first time: today around 44 
per cent of on-grid generation capacity lies in private hands, compared to 31 per cent for the 
states and 25 per cent for the centre, although the central generation enterprise NTPC has also 
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continued to flourish.9 However, transmission is still overwhelmingly dominated by public 
sector companies. Outside Odisha and a handful of cities, the crucial distribution segment 
remains in the hands of state administrations. State agencies thereby retained crucial roles as 
producers, financiers, and regulators. 
Even where public sector agencies continued to dominate, their activism nonetheless 
took new forms. Morphologically, by 2014 the power system included a variety of 
institutions whose characteristics and activities blurred the crude dichotomy of public and 
private ownership. New or reworked organizational forms—such as imported regulatory 
agencies, corporatized CPSEs, and public-private partnerships—had been grafted onto the 
older statist system. Given the sector’s “rent-thick” character, even the private players who 
especially captured the benefits of the sector’s opening were inextricably linked to and 
dependent on state resources in ways which conditioned their structures and practices, 
developing into large, vertically integrated conglomerates with extremely close ties to 
policymakers.10 The state thereby remained at the heart of the sector, even as private 
enterprises sought to leverage benefits from their asymmetric influence over this control. 
Yet this reinvented state capitalism has not so far amounted to a coherent alternative 
model either to the old state-dominated power system or to the “World Bank template” for 
deregulation. Instead it has allowed underperformance to persist, and undermined efforts to 
develop a coherent energy policy that integrated upstream and downstream concerns. The 
following sections concentrate on two dimensions of this failure: its financial dimension (the 
coexistence of resilient “populist” subsidies with apparent “crony capitalism”) and its 
administrative dimension (the fragmentation of administrative control, leading to increasing 
policy paralysis). The two are interlinked: institutional proliferation has facilitated the 
proliferation of rent-seeking and rents—competing interest groups are differentially able to 
penetrate institutions—even as institutional fragmentation has weakened the central apex’s 
ability to bolster the state apparatus against societal penetration. 
 
3 Dysfunction (1): segmentation and proliferating rents 
Section 2 introduced the idea that power sector reforms in India have often proceeded 
through a process of institutional layering, through which new elements are grafted onto an 
older system rather than displacing it. Superficially this trajectory resembles one of the most 
                                                   
9 Central Electricity Authority figures, dated 31 July 2017.  
10 Since around 2011 such firms have faltered, hit by overleveraging, insecure fuel supplies, and an overall glut 
of private power investments.  
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influential interpretations of this gradual liberalization, Rob Jenkins’ “reform by stealth” 
(Jenkins 1999). Jenkins argued that this type of gradualist institutional layering, rather than 
outright institutional displacement, facilitated reform; it was a political strategy to ensure that 
resistance could not coalesce around dramatic reforms (and, he added, it was accompanied by 
strategic rent-sharing to buy unexpected sources of support).  
Yet this compartmentalization works both ways. “Reform by stealth” produces 
cumulatively important liberalizing changes. But it also leaves unreformed zones outside its 
heartlands, and yet which are not in practice isolated from the reformed zones of the 
economy—that is, it produces segmentation. Such segmentation fragments the spread of 
reforms, just as Jenkins predicted it would fragment resistance. It provides multiple points of 
entry both for “new” private rent-seekers to influence the policy process, and veto points at 
which “old” rent-seekers can protect their own subsidies. This is true both of the 
segmentation of the policy process (multiple agencies at the federal and state level which can 
be lobbied) and the technical segmentation of the power cycle (into fuel supply, generation, 
transmission, and distribution). Competing interests can dominate in different domains of the 
power sector.  
 The result is that the proliferation of institutions—with only a weak hierarchical 
authority—has facilitated a proliferation of rents and rent seeking.11 In the medium term, 
institutional segmentation blocked the sweeping displacement of older rents but it also 
facilitated the expansion of new rents. In many states, the older populist subsidies, alongside 
tolerance of widespread theft (an informal subsidy), did not disappear with liberalization. In 
2011 all-India agricultural users continued to use 23 per cent of power but pay for only 8 per 
cent (up from 4 per cent a decade earlier) (Pargal and Banerjee 2014). Instead, they were 
supplemented by subsidies for politically connected producers in the form of preferential 
loans, cheap access to land and fuels, and access to policymakers auctioning projects.12  
These two sets of rent-seekers, “old” and “new”, operate through quite different 
modes of influence on the state: it is the state’s incoherence which they can both exploit and 
has thus far allowed them to coexist. To caricature a rich vein of political activity, the “old” 
rents for wealthy farmers and residential consumers are often secured through electoral 
politics and popular agitations at the subnational level, through everyday political 
interference with tariff setting or street-level tolerance of theft. In contrast, the “new” rents 
                                                   
11 This link between institutional complexity and proliferating rents has been made by neoclassical scholars; see 
especially Shleifer and Vishny (1993).  
12 For further details on this dualistic system of rents, see Chatterjee (2017a).  
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for politically connected private producers are secured more through lobbying at the higher 
levels of government at the centre and states where policy is formulated, supplemented with 
attempts to secure improved implementation terms on a case-by-case basis after the fact 
(Kochanek 1996).13 This masks considerable complexity, of course: as noted below, for 
example, the power and fertilizer ministries have often taken up the banner of the aam admi 
(common man) versus the upstream ministries.  
This segmentation of influence continues into the power sector itself. These new 
private players are concentrated in the more lucrative generation segment. Meanwhile, 
outside the purview of the profitable CPSEs the statist residual, notably in the distribution 
segment, remains financially viable only through underpayments, bailouts, and systematic 
supply rationing (scheduled load-shedding). More recent policy initiatives resemble attempts 
to institutionalize a segmented, dualistic system more explicitly. Increasing attention to urban 
distribution franchises, the rise of short-term market power purchases alongside long-term 
contracts, and special economic zones with dedicated power plants again attempt to create 
parallel systems. Without decent regulation, such a solution risks ceding “all the family silver 
(big cities, industrial areas, and SEZs [special economic zones])” to private players (Kumar 
and Chatterjee 2012: xiii). Lower-revenue consumer categories, such as poorer consumers in 
rural areas, will be left to increasingly decrepit public utilities.  
In practice, these “dual tracks” are intertwined. A market has been grafted on to an 
insolvent state system, and indeed ensures that the state system remains insolvent: these 
proliferating rents are funded in large part through short-term exploitation of natural 
resources, milking central state-owned enterprises and government control of the financial 
system,14 and suppressing demand (Chatterjee 2017a, 2017b). In this way, “financially viable 
units (generally privately owned) and insolvent systems (generally state-owned) can co-exist” 
in “a system in which parts of power generation and delivery are profitable even as other 
parts are plagued by nonpayment, inadequate investment, and economically inefficient 
operation” (Victor and Heller 2007: 289, 30).  
Jenkins’ “reform by stealth” thesis was accompanied by a bold analysis of the state 
elite’s room for manoeuvre: following Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), he suggested that the 
competition between India’s rival elites might open up greater room for independent state 
action (Jenkins 1999: 38). Yet in reality the Indian state is far from monolithic, and the state 
                                                   
13 Attempted tariff renegotiations are endemic in the energy sector, with companies making surprisingly low 
bids to secure projects and then seeking to renegotiate terms upwards. 
14 On government exploitation of public sector banks and institutions such as the Life Insurance Corporation, 
see Vaidyanathan and Musacchio (2012). 
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apparatus itself was not cohesive enough to resist the parallel pulls of pro- and anti-reform 
constituencies. Reform by stealth thus did not merely fragment societal interest groups, but 
exacerbated the fragmentation of the state.  
 
4 Dysfunction (2): the underlying crisis of control 
In the Indian power sector, the central government’s authority was weakened virtually from 
the outset. In the Emergency’s aftermath it became common to imagine that India’s 
constitution was an unusually unitary one, but early observers were more likely to critique the 
centre’s weakness. A Ford Foundation report, much discussed within the Nehru 
administration, concluded that “the Centre is without any real powers in almost the entire 
field of development” and “fundamentally lacking in administrative authority” (Appleby 
1957: 45, 10; see also Sinha 2005: 72–3).  
This was particularly pronounced in the power sector. The colonial prehistory of 
Indian electricity was regionally variegated (Kale 2014b). The constitutional division of 
responsibility only exacerbated this divergence. As noted above, this federal asymmetry of 
power and information helped to create regional political economies of populist power 
subsidies and theft, settlements which have proved extraordinarily difficult to alter 
subsequently in many states (Kale 2014a).15 Regional variance is only one side of the story; 
the other is state incoherence at the central apex itself. The centre’s organs of coordination 
remained feeble: by the mid-1960s the Planning Commission was already being marginalized 
by powerful and often quarrelsome ministries, while the Central Electricity Authority, 
virtually moribund into the mid-1970s, was considered by the SEBs and other state agencies 
merely “a hurdle to be negotiated” (Department of Power 1980: 110).  
It is with vertical control problems—the difficulties of federalism—that the power 
sector is particularly associated, and despite occasional calls to change it, this constitutional 
settlement looks very unlikely to change in the era of political regionalization. But even 
within these limits, the centre’s authority was decisively weakened. Horizontal coordination 
and control proved an underrated problem. It is often overlooked that liberalization and the 
regionalization of Indian politics coincided with a proliferation of state agencies and 
programmes.  
The rise of coalition governments from 1989 led to a proliferation of ministries. In 
July 1992 the single energy ministry created under Indira Gandhi was trifurcated to create 
                                                   
15 Change is not impossible: Gujarat is the most celebrated example of a state with powerful farmer lobbies that 
has nonetheless managed a turnaround. 
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separate ministries of coal, power, and new and renewable energy. “Perhaps the performance 
of no other infrastructure sector depends so heavily on the cooperation of other Ministries,” 
one power secretary reflected in his memoirs (Abraham 2009: 307); yet the fragmentation of 
the old Ministry of Energy left power policy divorced from its essential relations with the 
upstream industries. Through the rise of private lobbying and centrally sponsored schemes, 
power increasingly spread to these large, cash-rich infrastructure ministries. Infrastructure 
ministries thus gained in power and frequently pursued their own corporate interests, while 
the hierarchical authority that nominally coordinated them declined.  
Until 2014, then, India’s energy bureaucracy became increasingly “byzantine and 
fragmented” (Dubash 2011: 68). The result was internecine infighting and the absence of a 
coherent energy strategy. Individual projects and reforms were frequently delayed. As Modi’s 
then-new minister of an overarching energy portfolio, Piyush Goyal, put it: “One Ministry 
would propose, and another would dispose. Ministers and Ministries would be consistently at 
loggerheads with each other, and stories on interministerial turf-wars were a matter of 
bureaucratic legend” (2014: 6–8). The power ministry repeatedly blocked attempts by the 
upstream ministries to raise fuel prices to market levels, while one newspaper found that in 
2012 a “typical infrastructure project” required 56 permissions from 19 different ministries. 
Such disputes were mirrored by the enterprises that fell under these ministries: the thermal 
major NTPC, Coal India’s largest client, attacked the coal major for providing sub-par coal, 
with the feud at one point threatening to cut power to a swathe of eastern and northern India.  
Outside the ministries, the problem of state fragmentation was heightened in line with 
new international notions about power sector governance. The new public management 
(NPM)-style governance reforms pioneered in the Anglo-American world and mooted by 
international finance institutions often encouraged state fragmentation through 
“agencification”, the creation of specialist and nominally autonomous bodies to take on 
particular tasks. Further agencies proliferated, including a layer of regulatory bodies and the 
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, as noted above; a set of power trading specialists; an 
entirely new infrastructure for dealing with climate change; and new infrastructure financing 
and promotion corporations. If positive coordination (purposive attempts to increase 
coherence) was lacking thanks to the weakness at the central apex, negative coordination 
through alignment of these organizations’ missions also frequently broke down. Agencies 
have frequently challenged the ambiguous descriptions of their divisions of labour or sought 
to colonize new instruments, as in the case of the central and state electricity regulatory 
commissions, or the turf war between the central regulator and the Forward Markets 
 
 14 
Commission over regulation of power trading, a dispute that reached the Supreme Court. 
Inside the new administrative layer of nominally independent regulation, then, the 
organizational fragmentation and rivalries of the old system were replicated.  
While such turf wars were hardly new, ministerial fragmentation, the regionalization 
of politics, and the rise of new agencies all conspired to create an ever more “diffused, 
fragmented and siloe’d [sic] approach to energy policy” (Mehta 2013: 14). In the global 
North, it was quickly realised that NPM created problems of coordination, especially over 
“wicked” crosscutting problems such as energy and climate change. India has lagged behind 
in the “joined-up governance” attempts that have sought to counter state fragmentation as a 
result of new public management elsewhere in the world; its weak central apex until 2014 
developed no coherent response to the challenge. Hierarchical management proved difficult 
in the fragmentary state. Although it attempted to draft an intersectoral energy policy, the 
Planning Commission was “often hard-pressed to herd together large and powerful energy 
ministries” (Dubash 2011: 68) and increasing had to content itself with “working within the 
interstices of the dense structure of the sectoral ministries to influence policy”, as one former 
member recalled (Desai 2014). At times the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) stepped in, with 
some prime ministers holding the power portfolio themselves at key moments,16 but this 
mechanism remains vulnerable to the idiosyncrasies of the premier’s personality, as under the 
previous prime minister. For the United Progressive Alliance regime (2004–2014), 
“government by committee”—a form of horizontal management—became the favoured 
alternative via an endless series of (Empowered) Groups of Ministers, but this became 
perceived as merely a means for the PMO to shelve or distance itself from difficult issues.  
Within the national administration, layering was both a symptom and a further source 
of declining central coordination. The centre created new institutions to provide it with new 
tools—whether to create more malleable agencies, to accommodate coalition allies, or to 
keep “politics” more at arm’s length—but this in turn made the coordination of energy policy, 
within which power is embedded, more difficult. Central policymakers struggled to discipline 
not only large private firms, but also its own large, powerful agencies. This lack of cohesion 
is not new (Chibber 2002); in fact, it illustrates the path dependence in the balance of power 
                                                   
16 Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee retained the power portfolio during the 13-day BJP minority government 
of 1996, which extended the controversial central counter-guarantee given to Enron’s Dabhol plant. The next 
premiers, H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral (United Front), also retained de facto control under ministers of 
state; in 1996 Deve Gowda convened a key conference of State chief ministers specifically to discuss the power 
sector, which agreed a wide-ranging reform programme.  
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within the state. The process of institutional layering offered no solution to the pre-existing 
frailty of the central coordinating mechanism, however, but instead often exacerbated it.  
 This institutional complexity also facilitates the evasion of responsibility when policy 
(somewhat inevitably) goes wrong. As in the case of the 2012 blackouts, and less 
dramatically in explaining away the everyday failures to meet targets and improve supplies, 
different agencies seek to shift blame upwards, downwards, and horizontally to their rivals 
(Chatterjee 2012). This helped policymakers to dodge responsibility in the short and medium 
term. Such tactics proved to have limits, however: in the closing years before 2014 the 
absence of hierarchical authority and monitoring of the system’s persistent failures and pro-
business scandals prompted a backlash from both the public and regulators. Institutional 
proliferation and government by committee were popularly re-evaluated as symptoms of 
“policy paralysis”. The system of governance was therefore in a form of administrative crisis 
by 2014, laying the groundwork for the surprisingly decisive election verdict that summer 
and providing the new regime with its raison d’être and raison d’état.  
 In this context Narendra Modi’s new government has prioritized administrative 
change as much as economic reforms, remodelling the central energy bureaucracy. The 
regime has both sought to make micro-political changes—altering bureaucratic behaviour 
through increased surveillance—as well as reshaping state organizations, most famously 
killing off the long-beleaguered Planning Commission and breaking Coal India’s monopoly. 
In the energy sector, the key manifestation of this impulse was the move to “organic 
ministries”, as Modi labelled them. Power, new and renewable energy, and coal were all 
allocated to a single energy “superminister”, tellingly a young minister of state (independent 
charge) with much administrative talent but no real power base of his own. This combined 
two modes of hierarchical coordination: a unitary energy authority, but one that could not 
seriously rival the Prime Minister’s Office, which retained the capacity to take key decisions. 
In 2017 a further reshuffle once again detached ministerial oversight of power from coal, 
instead bracketing the latter with the similarly overlapping issue of the railways. 
This mode of operations has already produced some notable successes, especially in 
alleviating coal shortages and raising the environmental coal cess (typically blocked by the 
coal ministry). Yet the current government’s programme to restructure the debt of state 
distribution companies to incentivize reform at present looks little more successful than the 
ineffectual bailouts of 2002 and 2012. The path-dependent constraints that channelled the 
power sector’s pre-2014 reform trajectory will not easily be dismissed, though the current 
majority government has an unparalleled opportunity to rewrite the sector’s governance. It 
 
 16 
remains to be seen if its centralizing, technocratic mode of control will mark the end of the 
“patchwork politics” of the half-liberalized system, or will amount to a workaround rather 
than a recalibration of the state’s institutional foundations. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has used a quarter-century of electricity reforms to illuminate the changing 
nature of the Indian state. Since 1991, the state’s morphology and activities have altered 
substantially in response to the perceived failures of the older state-dominated system. Over 
this time, the Indian power sector evolved into a hybrid public-private system, marked by a 
series of organizational innovations that combine elements of liberalization and dirigisme. 
Today private firms control the plurality of India’s generation capacity, and on paper the 
sector’s governing rules have taken a radical turn to emphasize market solutions and the 
discipline imposed by competition. At the same time, through organs like corporatized state-
owned enterprises and new, nominally independent regulatory agencies, state activism has 
been both renewed and reinvented. In contradistinction to the deregulatory liberalization of 
the Anglo-American model, this chapter has labelled such a hybrid state-market combination 
state capitalism 2.0, emphasizing both the continued use of older forms of state activism 
across the purported “divide” of liberalization in 1991, their upgrading for the more 
liberalized economy, and the persistently close links between state and capital. 
 At the same time, the half-reformed power sector remains dysfunctional, suggesting 
that state capitalism and liberalization cannot simply be fused. Instead, they have been 
combined through an extended, ad hoc, and often painful process of institutional change, 
which has layered new and reinvented institutions atop the sediment of the pre-existing statist 
system. At least between 1991 and 2014, the resulting layered hybrid often tended to 
exacerbate rather than solve the power sector’s predicament. The result has been a protracted 
internal crisis of control, characterized by both organizational proliferation—new agencies 
have emerged ad hoc while existing ones are rarely destroyed—and a corresponding 
proliferation of rents as different interest groups influenced different state agencies, tiers, and 
aspects of the power system. This internal incoherence helps to explain both the absence of a 
broad energy strategy before 2014, the sector’s persistent financial and supply crisis, and 
finally the “policy paralysis” of the last years of the UPA administration regime—a low-grade 
crisis of legitimacy for the nascent system of state capitalism 2.0. This trajectory suggests 
that state capitalism 2.0 offers no simple alternative either to the old developmentalism or to 
the deregulatory mode of liberalization. As other large countries in the Global South attempt 
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to combine market discipline and administrative reform with renewed state activism, the 
difficulty of fusing these different logics is likely to become increasingly obvious in practice, 
even while such hybrids and their problems will take locally distinct forms. 
Through such an analytic, this chapter also hopes to rejuvenate the study of public 
institutions in South Asia. While existing literature on state capacity concentrates on macro-
level state autonomy from societal forces or micro-level bureaucratic quality, the analysis 
here suggests that the meso-level of state forms is also crucial. In India, a lack of state 
cohesion, or “an appropriate apportionment of power among state policy agencies” (Chibber 
2002: 952, emphasis in original), has repeatedly undermined policy coherence. More than 
this, state-society relations are mediated through the structure of the state. Against analyses 
that attempt to distinguish state capacity (“the chain of command”) from India’s problematic 
relationship with society (“the chain of sovereignty”; Evans and Heller 2015), this chapter 
has shown that the state’s organizational problem and its political problems are inextricably 
entwined. Paying careful attention to the layered dynamics of institutional change can help to 
explain the apparently contradictory or “Janus-faced” nature of the contemporary Indian 
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